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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Tiii·~ S'l'A'J']<~ OF lT'l'AH, I 
Pla.intiff, 
vs. 
'I'll I~ 1-IOKORAULJ~ HEKRY RUG- )( 
t:l·~Rl, DIS'l'RICT JUDGE, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
10730 
S1'AT1£l\TEN'I' OF NA'l'LTRE OF CASf1~ 
Thi:-; i:-; an original lHoeee<ling in this Court to slww 
•·au:-;(• why tlw <·xtraordinar~- \nit prayed for in plain-
til'f':-; pdition should not h<' granted. The writ prayed 
for is to C'<>lllJld th<' defendant Dist rid Judge to with-
draw an onl<•r mad<· on tlw trial <'ourt lPvel suppressing 
('Pl'1ain t>vidPnC'<'. 'l'h<' ]Jl'O<'PPding is a novel one and so. 
l'ar as \\'(' an• infornwd is without precedPnt in this 
t 'ourt. 
DISPONI'l'IOK lK Lowgn COUH'l' 
ThP onlPr on motion to suppress \\'as t•ntered m 
1 11111inal adion ~o. 195::lt, Oistriet Court, Salt Lake 
t '11unty, I 'tall, 'l'lw Stat<' of l Ttah, plaintiff, vs. C. vV. 
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Brady, Jr., defendant. A ('Op)· of tlw ordPr is attaeli1·d 
to defendant's ans\n'r lwrein designated as [<;xhihit :;, 
A copy o.f the motion to wppress is abo attaclwd to 
defendant's answer herPin indicated as Exhihit 1. A <·oi11 
of a supplement to tlw motion is attached to d<>fPndant'.' 
answer herein marked as Exhibit 2. 
The order suppressed the testimony of Mr. Brady 
as set forth in the indictment in criminal action No. 
19531, and prohibited the use of the same at Uw trial 
of said action. The trial setting was vacated at the 
request of the StatP, the eounsl'l for the plaintiff having 
in 01wn enmt stated that he could not proceed with tlw 
trial of th<· adion without tht" evidence so sup1>ress1><1. 
rrhe Stab:' of 1 · tah filed an appeal to this Court in 
c·riminal adion Xo. 19531 and subsequently, upon its 
motion, tlw appeal was dismissed. There has been no 
further }H'oeeeding at the trial court level in criminal 
action No. 19531. 
'l'h<· NtatP is tl1<· 1novinµ; party ostensibly :-;<~eking 
a writ of mmHlah• to n·qui n· the defendant District 
.Judge to \1it11dra\\· t!JC• rnli11g made at the trial court 
level. 
N'l1 A'l 1 J~i\l J<~~'L' < lF FACTS 
Tlw indi('i11wnt in nilllirntl adim1 Xo. 1UG:31 charge' 
thP defrn<lant Brad)· "itl1 haYing giv<·n false tPstirnon.1 
Jwfore tlw Urand .Jur)· of thP County of Salt Lak<' 011 
the 16th day of Au.gust, 1%3. ~lr. Brady was in(l'l' 
111u:all'd ('OlH'l'l'lli11g 11iatt(·rs th(' subjl'd of a suhst'liUl•nt 
1Jl(lid11w11t again:-:t ltiu1 in \\'!tat is kno\\'n as criminal 
ad ion ~ o. 1 !JG3S, a <·onspi l'<l(')' ehaiw•. At the tirnP of the 
alkµ;ed t(•stirnon)· ~lr. Brad:· \\'as mHkr subpoPna but 
\lib not advisl'd that lw \nts sus1H·ct or that his alleged 
1·(1rnlu('t \1·as th<· targd of the inn•stigatiYe functions 
and po\1·<·rs of tlH· Chand .hu)·. Th<· subj<-'d of the irn1uiry 
1111 tl1<' l (ith da.Y of August, J 9(i:i, \Yas whl'tlwr l\lr. Brady 
lin<l violat<·d Titl<· /fi, Chapt<'r :28, ::-lPctions ~l, +, 1, :21, 48, 
:1!l( I) and (ii, l 'tah CodP Annotated 1933, and Article 13, 
St>dion S of tlw Constitution of litah. 11 his is evidenced 
Ii)· tltt• hill of' particulars furnished by the State in 
niJ11inal adion ?\o. 193:)1. 1'hl' eonspiracy indictment 
knmrn as nirn inal ad ion X o. 19558, follo\\'Pd, charging 
tlt1· d<'fl'IHlant Brad)· and otlit•rs "·ith having conspired 
to l'1H11rnit and with having committed crimes in violation 
of th1· sp1·cific statuks mentioned. 
,\t th1· ti1111• of tla· ruling IIO\\' eomplained of the 
Conrt, tht> 1kfr11dant District .Judge, made findings as 
follows: 
"'J1he eomt finds that tl11~ grand jury is a 
<·otut of this ~tate and that this defendant, that 
i\lr. Brady, th<' defendant in this case, was in 
suhstancP and pf fret a targ<•t. He was the cyno-
sun• of neighl)().ring eyes. He was the focal point 
or one of the focal points of investigation against 
hi111, and that tlH• State of Utah knew it at the 
tinw that the:' eall<'d him as a witnt-ss and he 
tPstifi<·d in that crnw and thL• perjury charges 
\\'hi<·h ar1· now, iwrjur)' eharg<' \\'hich is now found 
against him by thl' indictment is thl• n~sult of tlw 
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investigation that was madL• and thv calling- ul 
that man as a witness. 
''The court finds that lw \rns not an onlinan 
witness, but that he was a witness in subsfanc.r· 
and effect a defendant in the proce(~ding. 
"The ... effect of a subpoena. One who io 
brought into court under subpoena and testifoi., 
pursuant thereto acts under compulsion.'' ( R-88) 
Counsel for the Stak in his brief hen~in distort~ 
the record by a personal rderence. He states that Mr. 
Brady when appearing before the Grand .Junr on August 
l(), 1965, \Yas ''well coached'' in making his reqnl'fit for 
eounsd, and i111pli<>s that defendant's eounse>l ]H•rein \\'li.~ 
counsel for ~Ir. Brady at the said time and place. Mr. 
Brady at thP tiwe of his appearance before the Grand 
.T ury \nls not n·pn•sented by eounsel hen•in. Courn;el 
now ap1waring for th<• defendant District Judge repre-
sent thP dd'endant Brady in the criminal actions rr 
feued to, hut sueh employment did not occur until after 
thl' lst of .J anuar~-, J9Gfi. Furthermore, the vortion11 of 
plantiff's pdition that an~ denied by the defendant Dis-
trict .Judg(• 011 lack of information and Lelief arc denial;; 
in good faith. 
rl'he argm11enb that follow are tailored to the exaeti-
tud(• expressed hy the dd'enclant herein at the time nf 
the ruling: 
''O(•ntl<·111Pn tlw court has mavlw extPrnkd 
itself in its n·rn~rks hPre, lmt the c~urt wants tu 
111ak<· it 1>lain that the court's ruling does not 
affect the innot<'l1Cf• or guilt of this defendant. 
'!'his is a matter of whether or not the dcfen<lant \; 
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right:-; hav(• lw(•Jl vio.lab•d undn Article 1, Section 
I~ of tll<· l'onstit ntion aml tlw Laws of this Land, 
arnl tit(• (·011rt finds that it ha:-; lwen and the motion 
to qua:,;h and :-;up]Jr(':-;;-; <U'(', or to :-;uppress tlw 
1•vi(l\·rn·l· i:-; granted." (R-94) 
),j{(} l 'l\I 1£:K'J' 
1. Th<'re is 110 <'.rfrnordinur1; writ tli11t ('{f.JI lJJ'OjJ-
<'rly issue. 
\\'rit:-; of rnnndaun1:-; and ('Pl'tiorari an· n•cognized 
\1\ thl' Co11:-;tit11tion of thi:-; State lmt s1weial fo1111s an· 
a\Joli:-;IMl ],~- Hui(' liG B (a), r·tuh Rules of Cii:il Pro-
11 d11n·. ,\.rtid(' Ylll, S('etion -1- of tlw Co11stihttion of 
1·11171 providP;-; in l'art: 
"The Su1n·ernp Comt shall have original jur-
i:-;<lidion to is:,;u(' \nib of mandamus, certiorari, 
prohihition, qno· warranto and habeas corpus. 
* * *" 
(a) Certiorari. 
Plaintiff':-; petition pra.Ys for a eoercivt' \\Tit, a func-
tion not that of <'Prtiorari which is merl'ly a writ of 
11·\·i<·w to dd<•n11i1w legality. The diffen•nce between tlw 
l110 \\Tit:-; i:-; :-;uecindl~· :-;tat\•d in 1-1- A111. J11r. 2d. Cer-
1/(miri, Ser·firJll -1-, lHl/J<' 781. 
'l'lw till\(· lwnon·cl ml(• in thi;; jnriioiuidion is to th<· 
'l't'1·d that on <·Prtiorari tht- qm·stion for d<•termination 
Ii\ this Court i;-; whethPr thP di::;trict court had or exceeded 
it;-; .iuris<lidion, and not tlw question of \\"hether the 
\11\11·r <·onrt <lid or di<l 110t siwak l'OITectly ''by tlw law". 
'\'iii,, \\a:-; tit(' pr011onrn'\'lll\'l1t of thi:-; Court in following 
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a number of prior decisions wlwn in J/a1111 c. MorrlsrJ11, 
10() Utah 15, 14-1P.2d5-!~l (H)..1.3) it was stated: 
"This court is limited in the scopt• of 1t., 
review on certiorari. 'l1he only matter for deter-
mination is whether the district court had jmi~ 
diction or whether having jurisdiction it exct•edPrl 
that jurisdiction. 
''Justice ·w olfe speaking in tlw case of At-
wood v. Cox, District Judge, 88 Utah -137, 55 P.2d 
377, 380, makes the following statement: '1\fany 
definitions of jurisdiction are given in 15 c .. J' 
723, Section 13. 'rhey all mean, fundamentall>, 
the power or capacity given hy the law to a court. 
tribunal, board, body, or officer to entertain, hear, 
and determine certain controversies. * * * It doe~ 
not mean that the court must speak correctly 
hy the law. \Vhat it says may be incorrect. * * *" 
"Whether the court was in error is not to 
he determined in this proceeding." ( Certio.rari) 
Among the several cases cited in 1llan11 v. Jllorrlsu/I 
supra is State 1·. Sa!Jll(u1. ~)() l 'tah 512, G2 P.2d 1:n5, 
wlH·n• tlw court stated: 
"'l'hen" is soltl(; indication that courts vie1r 
tli!:' ·writ of certiorari, when used in this rnannPl', 
as liPing an appeal in itself, and it is not uncom-
mon to fiml lant,'lrnge in the C'a:ses to the effrd 
that tlw stat1• should not be permitted to aecorn 
plish h:v certiorari what it cannot do by appeal.'' 
'rlw ~upl'('lll<' Colll't of th(· ~tat<· of \Vashing-ton in 
tlie n•e1·11t c·as1• of Slut,, 1. Whit11c,1J, -HS P.2<l 1-t-3 (Se11t. 
s, 19G(i) 1kparts from tl1t• philm:opl1' of tl1i;.: Court anil 
of its own prior de('isio11:-; aud Yastl~- l'nlarges upon till' 
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11rit of ('(' rtiornri. 'l'h<· trial eourt sign Pd an ordn re-
j1·dinµ; th<' statP's offn of proof by granting a contin-
lWJH't> and th<· r<·spond<'nt (•ons<·nt<•d to a dispersal of 
tl11· jur:· !'or tlw purpos<> of allo\\·ing th<· state to apply 
!1i ti](' \Yashington Supn•111p Court for a writ of certiorari 
t11 n·vi(•\\. till· trial c·<mrt's ruling on tlw motion. It re-
11111ins \o. lw S<'<'n ~w]u•tltn the plaintiff in tlw instant 
11tatt(•r \\ onld aclvoeatc• in this Court and whether this 
Court "onlcl snbsnihe to tl11· pltilosoph:· of the vVashing-
ton court. 
( h) Jla11da11111s. 
Tli1· \\Tit of mandamus <·mmot lw mwd to correct 
1·rrors of jndgllJ(•nt lrn\\·<·vpr gross. 'l'his is the ruling 
11t' tl1is Court in a nnmlwr of easPs, and more iiarticularly 
i11 l ·tu/! CojJ]Jcr Co. r. District Cuurt, 91 LTtah 377, 6-1-
1'.:!d :2-1-1 ( 1 !B7): 
"'l'h<· n•asons for such holdings are that 
\\ hnP a eourt has jnrisdidion of tlH· subject-
lllattn ancl of tlw parties, rnlings made on cle-
11rnn<•r:-:, iwrmitting or n•fu:,;ing amendments to 
p!Padings, 111otions to strikP, de., involve and 
i11\'ok<> jurisdidion not uni~· n·quiring but de-
111arnling jndg111Pnt of tlw eourt with respect 
th<•rp\o, and no matt<>r ho\\· <'l'l'Oneous the rulings 
111a~· lw in :,;ueh 1iartienlar, tlH·y may not be re-
vi<·wed on any of the Pxtraordinary n•medies. This 
<·ourt i:-; finnl:· eo11nuittt>cl to that doctrine. And 
,,·Ji1·n· a c·ourt ha:-; juri:-;didion of tlw subject-
lllattn and of th<· parti<'s, it indeed would be 
strang<' to adopt a cliff<'n·nt dodrin<', that when-
<'Y<•r n rnli11g i~ mad<· on a dt>11rnrrer or with 
r<·sp<Tt to arn<·rnln1t•nb to pl<'adings or motions 
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to strike, resort may be had to one or more of th1: 
extraordinary n:medies to review or annul :rncli 
rulings." 
The rule is stated in Albert v. United State::; lJist1 ict 
Court, 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960): 
"Mandamus does not lie to compel a judge of 
an inferior court to reverse a decision made b1 
him in the exercise of a legitimate jurisdidi01;. 
Ex parte Flippin, 1876, 9-± U.S. 3-±8, 2-± L.ed. 19-±, 
or to compel him to decide according to the dic-
tates of any judgment but his own, United State,. 
v. ·Lawrence, 1795, 3 Dall. -±2, 1 L.ed. 502, or to 
control the c·xercise of his discretion. Gottliev v. 
Huhenstein, 6 Cir., 1958, 252 F.:2d 779. This rem-
edy is reserved for really extraordinary cause~. 
It may not be used as a substitute for appeal. 
Hoche v. ]jJvaporated Milk Association, 1943, 319 
lT.S. 21, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.ed. 1185; Beneke v. 
\Veick, 6 Cir., 1960, 275 F.2d 38." 
'Vhe g·ent>ntl rnh~ is stated in 35 Arn.Jur., lliandamu0, 
8Pe. :294, page 52: 
"A judge or court ·wm not be com1wlled by 
mandalllns to entertain a criminal proceeding 
where no dut:- to do· so is imposed by law, as 
where the lH'OSl·eution is had under a void law. 
ln so far as th<' eourt or judge acts in a judicial 
capacit:- in criminal matters, and does not abuse 
the powers eonfrned, mandamus will not lie to 
direct or review the action taken." 
'J'he ease of Hi,r;gills 1·. FJ11rton, (i-t lltah 550, ;;::;)~ 
Pac. 915 (19:2-±), pnrnitted ec·rtiorari from an order 
quashing tht> information. 'I1li« motion to <flrnsh wa~ 
made upon the sole grnund that there was a eivil aetion 
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jll'Jlding to ddPl'llliJH• tltl' O\\'npn;hip of the stoek, rrhf• 
pr1·('iS1' qnPstio11 was wlwthPr the dt>fendant judge ex-
1·1·1·1hl Iii;.; jmisdietion in quashing the information upon 
gr1Jund;.; otlH·r than tlw statPd ;.;tatutory grounds therefor. 
()n tTlwaring a fnrtl11T PXplanation wa:s made to the 
!'ff1·d that tlw motion to quash \Ya:,; hased "entirely upon 
111ntfrr d1•hors th1· eriminal n'cord'' and that a civil suit 
lH'nding is no ground fo1· qua:,;hing an information under 
l'onql. Laws 1 ~)17, Section SSIH. ln the petition for rehear-
ing il was 1·xplmwd that "that statutP was exclusive, and 
11nh·ss thP ground n·lit>d on was within tht> statute the 
mot ion to qnash should not prevail." 
Tlw writ of eertiora1·i in Higgins 1;. Burton supra 
11as pn·mi:sed upon the proposition that the lower court 
had l'XCPP(kcl its jurisdiction. In the instant matter it 
i~ not tontl'nded that the lmn.·r tourt did not have the 
.indi('ial prerogative to suvpress the evidence upon the 
grounds elai1m'd. The subject is Pxtensively annotated 
111 109 ,1.L.R. 793 and 91 A.L.R. :2d 1095. 
:2. The order suppres:;ing the testinwny of Mr. 
Brady ucforc the Grand J1try was proper. 
'l'lw ordt>r of the def Pndant District Judge herein 
11 as has(•d n von tlH· argmnPnts of counsel, the considera-
tion o I' tlH• n•eonls and fiks in eriminal action No. 19531 
toµytli1·r with tlw rPl'ords and files in the action identified 
a:-; ni1ninal adion No. 10558, the stipulation made in 
op1·n <·<,urt hy eonnsd for the State that tlw defendant 
11.ac: at all tirn<':-: h<•fon' thP Grand .Jurors under the 
1·umpulc:io11 of a subpoena, and upon tht• preeise findings 
;1:-; follows: 
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"l. That the ::mbject of inquiry bdore th 1, 
Grand Jurors of Salt Lake County, Utah at the 
time of and in connection with the testimonv ~M 
forth in the indictment in the instant action. wa~ 
whether a crime had been c011m1ittt>d by tlH~ d~­
fendant in violation of rritle 76, Chapte~· 28, Sec-
tions 3, -±, 7, 21, -±8, 59 ( 1) and Gl, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, and A1·ticle 13, Section S of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
"2. That the defendant (Brady), witlt others, 
was thereafter charged by said Grand Jurors witl1 
having conspired to commit the identical crime~, 
the subject of the aforesaid inquiry, the i11clict-
ment for which now pends in the abo,ve entitled 
C'ourt, identifit>d as Criminal ~ o. 19558. 
"~1. That the defendant lwrein was compelled 
o\'Pl' his objection and in the absence of counsel, 
notwithstanding his demand and request therefor, 
to give evidence against himself as set forth in 
tlw indictment herein, which evidence in whole 
or in part is the basis of or within the overt acb 
set forth in the indictment in said action, Criminal 
Ko. 19558." (R-53 and 54) 
Jnlten·nt in the onlc•r arc• the findings of fact as 
sd forth aboH' which indude the compulsory self-in-
crimination under circmustances where l\Ir. Brady was 
in narnl~ a ,,-ihwss hl.·fore the Grand .Jury hut in fact 
a defendant and the· target of its invPstigation. 
Article· T, 8<:'dion 1 J of tlw Crmstititti-011 of Utah pro-
Yides in liart, "the• <WC1lSPd shall not lH' compelled to giw 
Pvidence against hiu1sPll'.'' 'L'h1• casP of State v. Byi11gto11, 
11+ Ftah 38-8, 200 P.:2cl 7:2:) (10+8) is controlling l~Vl'll 
in the absence of Massiah u. l!uited States, 377 U.S. 201, 
11 
fc',rn/)('17o r. Illi11ois, :rn-\ [;.s. -+78, hoth decided in 1964, 
and 01rleo11 1-. Wuiinniqht, :37:.21'.S. 335 (1963). 
111 8tufe I'. Bvington the dPfrndant was convicted of 
pnjm)· in tlH' s1c'cond clegrpe and upon appeal the con-
yidion was s<'t asidP ·with direetions to dismiss the action. 
'11li1• ('lia1w· or ]Wrjur~- grew out of a hearing on an order 
to sho\\ <-crn::-;1· in a divon·p action. T'he defendant was 
\1don· 1l1P <'onrt without an attonwy, and after the wifo 
Imel tl'stifo·d tlw court tokl defrnclant that he could cros::-;-
1•\m11i1H' h1·r and \\-hc•n hv dPelined the court told the 
r!Pf1•nrlant that lw could take the· witness stand in his own 
hl'half. This h1· ah:;o rdust>d. Thereupon the court said, 
"\Y('ll, <·m111· up lwn._ T ·want to ask TOU some questions 
1 liPn.'' )di<'l' lwing sworn opposing eounsel examined the 
1l<'frrnlant and the U]rnhot of the situation was that both 
iii<· <l<'frndant and the so-callt·d wife committed perjury 
as to th(' fact of thP marriage. At the trial on the perjury 
('harg·e tlw court received in evidence over defendant's 
ohj1;dion::-; th<' transcript of his testimony in the hearing 
011 tlw onl<>r to ::-;h<rn- cause to the effect that he waio 
11iani1'd to a woman whom he claimed to be his wife. 
( )11 ilH· a pp('al the defendant eon tended that under the 
«i1·<·umstaneps inclieakd and by the use of the transcript 
11f l1is tPstimony in tliP !waring on the order to show 
1·:111 s.- h 1 • was emu pe 11 eel to he a witness and to give evi-
d1 ·rn·( •against himself "in a criminal case" in violation of 
t\i1· ~>th Allwndrn<'nt of tlw Federal Constitution and of 
Al'tic·le I, Section 12 of our State Constitution. 
AftPr a prononneement to the effect that the privi-
l1·g(' against s<'lf-incrirnination protects a witness as well 
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as a party accused of crime in a civil as well as m a 
criminal action from being required to give testimony 
which tends to inl'.riminate him and that such include, 
"'any fact" which is a necessary or essential part of a 
crnne, this Court stated: 
"Generally such question is raised on objee-
tion tn giving of testimony but that is not rwce~­
sarily the case. Here the witness did not claim the 
privilege when the question was asked. But he 
did decline to testify and testified only when 
required to do so by the court. He was a layman 
without experience with courts, without advice of 
C'ounsel or knowledge of his right to refuse to give 
self-incriminating testimony.'' 
When the defendant was asked whether he had re-
married lw \Yas 01wnly and notoriously living as husband 
and wifr with the \\-oman ·who ·was not his wife and a 
child horn from that relationship. "vVhen this qucstioll 
was pnt to hirn hl' \\'as rvquin·d to either refuse to answer 
nr to admit mw of the elements of such crinw or give fals1' 
tPsti111011~Y." l~1·ing ]Jlaeed in such position the court 
stated: 
"~irn.:<~ lw did not knm\- that he had the right 
to refuse to answer his only alternative was to 
admit his guilt 01' give faise testimony. rl'hat 
persons shall not be placed in such a position i~ 
orn~ of the purposes of these constitutional provi-
sions. l~nder such eircmnstances snch eviclem1· 
is not admissihl1• in a suhse1111ent prosecution for 
p1·rjnr~Y otlwn,·is<' th1· inmnmity from giving self· 
in('l'i111inati.nµ; t1·sti1nm1y ,,·oulcl he of no vahw t11 
him." 
Tl1is <·onrt quotl'<l at IP11µ:th fr()rn ,'J'fufr c. ('upcrlou, 
~Iii ~lo. :lJ+, :!()/ ~.\\'. l!l;>. 'l'h(•J'p tl11· d<·fondant was 
r1·quir1>d to giv1• h·sti111011.\· lwfol'l' a Urand .Jury ,,·hich 
11as im1·stigatii1g \\·]u·thn Ii(• \\·a::; living with a woman 
11ot his \\'ifo in OJH'll arnl notoriou::; adult<•r) \\ithout any 
11arning of his iHmrnnit:-· from giving· self-irn:riminating 
1·ridl·m·<·. I IP tPstifiPd that Ii<· \nls llHllTiPd to the woman 
and \\as lat<•J' <·m1vid<·d o!' 1wr.inr>· in so t<•sti(\·ing. Tlw 
l'lltlrt s<'1 asid(• th(• 1·011vidion 011 th(' ground that evide1H'<' 
ot' 11is tPstiltlon:-· lH'foJ"(• tlw Urnnd .Jur~- was not admis-
'ihl1· in su<'h 1n·os<·cution lw<'aUS<· his iunmmity from 
gi1111g· sdf-i1)('ri1t1inating· <·vid<:>llcl: would tlw1·eby be vio-
lah·d. This ('Olll't qllotes in vart from th<· ( 11/jJt'l'lOll ('aSt' 
:1~ follows : 
"'As a basis for this ]H'ose<'ution defendant 
\\as hal<'d h(•for(' a grand .iur!' of his eounty. 
and tlwn· urnlPr oath compelled to answer certain 
qrn•stions, truthful answers to, which would (as 
th<:~ statP is BO\\' hen• insisting) have required a 
<·onfrssion of his guilt of anotlwr C'l'illle then under 
im·<'stigation hy this jury. \Vl1en defendant was 
thus compelled by tlH·se proceedings before the 
grand jur>·, either ''to <'tmfrss and he hanged" or 
to f'wear a lie, he took refuge (again, as the state 
llO\\ hen· (·ontPnds) in th<• latter alternative. 
Promptly lw \ms indit'h•d for p<'rjur~·. and thi~ 
prn~<·(·ution and <·onvid ion followed. 
'' '] t i~ plain to lH' S<'l'll that tlw inqnisitiou 
wli('n·at th<· all<'g<·d rH'rjnry was eonunitted was in 
a rnost f'<'riou~ as1wct a violation of defendant's 
<'Ollstitutional right not to lw compelled to testify 
against himst>lf. ... '11lw lc•ast that may be said 
ol' tlw proceedings b>· wluch this defendant was 
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induced to perjure hi1rn;elf i::; that the stat(• j 11 
thus compeling either a sworn confession or per-
jury, was morally an aider and abettor in tJi, 
perjury charged. 
'''The lmv \Vhich govern::; irn1ui::;itions bdor1· 
grand juries does not contemplate that an accu~ed 
person, whose alleged crimes are at the tinw the 
subject of inquiry may be compelled to come be-
fore such a jury and there in secret and on oath. 
without counsel or friends be required either to 
confess his guilt or to conuuit perjury. . . . Nu 
objection was made that defendant's testimony 
before the grand jury, being involuntary, wa:; 
inadmissible, but so mud1 is said in palliation of 
defendant's guilt, if in fact he be guilty, and in 
criticism of the proceeding adopted to corn1wl 
him to commit the crime herein complained of.'" 
This court in the Byington case conunented with 
approval on Twigg:i v. State, Tex. Cr. R., 75 S.W. 531, 
and attributed to that court the following: 
"There defendant \ms convicted of iierjur)' 
before a grand jury which was investigating a 
eharg<=~ of rape against another man. In the cours1· 
of his testimony, he denied having committed 
adulten with a sister of the woman involved in 
the nq;e eharg(', of which offense he was later 
eonvieted. 'L'h<-~ court held that the testimony given 
hefore the grand jury was not admissible in evt-
denc0 on hi::; trial for perjury, because he was 
(kniecl hi::; privil\~ge to not give incriminatlng 
evideneL' agai1rnt hirn;::;di', even though he did not 
claim such iirivil<•ge.'' 
'l'his Court voints out that the testimony given by 
Byington \\as not i11 the eourse of an inve::;tigation 
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aµ,ain,.;t hi111 for a (']'irninal off<.11.;(• a.; in th(· C1tjJ<'rlu11 cas(' 
.'uprn, hut 11\'V(•rtlit>lc•.;.; statvs: 
"Hut thl· l'ow.;titutional prnv1.;1ons grant tlw 
iu111Lunity from giving such testimony in a crim-
inal easl• and under that provision, even though 
IH· fir.;t gav<· such testimony in a civil action, 
1·vid<•nce then;of ma:-· not be used against him in 
a l'riminal l'atil'. S('(' n·fl'n•nel'S to \Vigrnore above 
<·ited. (-nder thi· cin·umstances of this case, he 
\\·a.; eoH1pt>ll<·d to an.;,,·<·r questions which, if an-
.;\\·<·n·<l truthfull~·. lw \\·onld have to give evidence 
o.f' orn· Pl<>ment of a nirn<· which he had committed. 
111•r1·, a.; in th1· hrn <·asp.; above cited, he did not 
ohj<'et to answl•ring lmt he did not know that he 
had a right to make· such objedion. If such testi-
11wny can he mwcl against him in a case of this 
kirnl thPn his privilq!;e against self-incrimination 
111a:-· lH· violated and he c·tm still be convicted as a 
r1·sult of sud1 violation h:-· the court. Such was 
not tlu· inkntion of the frarnL·rs of our Constitu-
tions." 
Plaintiff in thP instant mattn atten11>ts to distin-
guish tlw Hyi11gto11 case and th1:• companion case of Stat<' 
1. l/itlchi11so11, lH Dah ±09, :WO P.:.M 7:33 (19±8), on the 
theory that .Mr. Brady was a ''voluntan''' ·witnes:-; before 
tl1<· (hand .Jnr:». This attPrnptPd distinction ignorPs the 
1·\pn•,;:-: finding in th<' onln eo111plairn:•d of to tlH' effect 
tliat l\lr. Brad~, was at all time:-: und.Pr compulsion of a 
"illi[JO<'na and tlw 8tipnlation of the State's attorney to 
that pffrct. An att<·mpt is made to distinguish the Bying-
/()11 arnl If 1rtchi11so11 l'HSl'8 on the 1ll"ellli8P that Mr. Brady 
11 n~ "tltornughl.Y a<lvi.;<'<l of his right to n•fusp to an8wer 
111(·rillli11nting q1wstion.;." '!'his i8 a s1>ecious argmnent 
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and is contrary to tlH· fact as found by th<· dd<·ndan1 
District Judge after full cmrnideration of tlw matt<·r. Till· 
plaintiff in its brief does not attempt to rationali"'" 1ltr· 
Caperton and Twiggs cases. 
In Unit eel States i:. TV inter, :3-1:8 l1'.:2d 20-t (2nd Cir. 
1965) a case cited hy lllaintiff as refll~cting the same 
argument as made by the witness Brady, is not in point. 
The defendant 'Winter, as is the usual practice \\'ith 
witnesses appearing before a federal grand jmy, signed a 
"waiver of immunity" which lw indicated as being a 
considered act on his part. Furthennore, he was in-
fonned hy the Fnited States attorney in charge of the 
inquiry that he was a subject of the grand jury invl'sti-
gation. Th<· foreman of the grand jury also advised 
\Vinter that ht:• was UH· subject of an investigation into 
his condud as an <'mplo)-<'<' of F.H.A., and that as "a 
prospectiw defrndant" an:dhing that he might say would 
he used again"t him at a latn procePding and that )1t• 
ll<'e<l not testify as to thos<· rnattPrs which might tend to 
ineriminate him. 
JJ11rpliy 1. TVa.terfroid Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 
12 L.ed.:2d (i/S, 8-! S.Ct. 15D-t (1%-t), attributes to Jlfolloy 
1.·. Hogwi, :m~ lT.S. l, 12 L.ed.2<l G53, 8-! S.Ct. 1±89 (19fi+) 
decided thl' s<UHP da)-, 1l1P holding that the Fifth Amen<l-
rnent lll'ivih·ge against s<•lf-incrimination must be deemed 
full)- fa]lplicahl<· to tl1<· State~ through the Fomfrpnth 
Arnendi1wn t. In JI u r1;lu; th(' <'olut i·<·.i<~ets all <'arli<'l' 
C'at,;es limiting the F'ifth Amenduwnt privilege again~l 
self-incrimination to the exf~rtion of the power of th(' 
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l•'t•cl('rnl Uovc>rrn11Pnt to <·0111pel incrilllinating testimony 
11ith a view tn enable that same government to convict 
a lllan out of his own mouth. In an article appearing in 
tlw Ma:· 1%G American Bar Associution Journal, Vol. 
.-l~, pagl' -t-1-:1, hy Richard A. Givens, Assistant United 
States .-\ttorney, Nouth em District of New York, entitled 
"l\(•corH:iling the Fifth AlllPndment with the Need for 
\lon· l<~ff Pdiv<' La\\ l~nfo1·<'l'lt1ent," t110 author states in 
pa.rt: 
.. rl'hl:' major imrpos0s eonsiderecl to ht> served 
Ii)- the privilege toda~y are discussed in the opinion 
of Mr. .J ustiee Goldberg in ill urphy v. Waterfront 
Co111mission, :378 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1964), and in 
l1~n1·in N. Oriswold's The Fifth Amendment 
Today: 
"l. Prott>dion of the suspect from a tri-
lemrna in which he is faced with the alterna-
tives of (a) giving incriminating answers, 
( b) being prosecuted for contempt for refus-
ing· to answer or ( c) being prosecuted for 
perjnry if hP dPnies ·wrongdoing and the 
denial, \Yhether tnw or not, is disbelieved." 
Within tlw com·ept of thP fon'going is the case of 
Peo1;lc 1:. 8chu-(lr2:, 2-tS Pac. 990 (Calif. 1926): 
"'Clw weight of authority dearly supports 
the~ proposition that one who is brought into court 
unclP"r a subpot'na and testifies l!Ursuant thereto 
acts unclPr compulsion." 
In ll11iled States 11. RiGrazia, 213 F.Supp. 232, (D.C. 
X,D. 111, 1~JG:l) thl' <·ourt ~tnJPcl that the rtc•al quPstion 
1111~ 11 lwtlwr in tlt<:• a h:::;ence of a warning the clef endant 
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may have tended to incriminate himsl'lf by his kstilllem\ 
before the grand jury. 
''If so, the indictment must he q mit.;he<l, for it 
would violate the eonstitutional precept PlllhodiPil 
in the Fifth Amendment'1:3 privilege against self-
incrimination, and all the Government's most self 
serving characterizations of Calzavara's status 
could not save it in the faee of this. Nor could 
it be saved by the subsequent discoVL'ry of inde 
pendent information ·warranting his in<lietrnent. 
"This, of course, force1:3 the Government to 
determine when a warning is appropriate. But, 
after all, it is not an unreasonable burden, espe-
eiall:- since the P. S. Attorney or his assistant 
is in a good position to know what tel:3timony ('an 
he expected. If the GovPrnment chooses to eall 
a witnesi:3 before the Grand Jury who is or may 
lie a defendant, its own self-interest as well as a 
proper regard for constitutional due proces,; 
would seem to dictate the issuance of a warning 
and the securing of an immunity waiver. rrhP 
risk it nms in failing to warn is a quashed indict-
ment. In order to avoid this contingency, the fair 
and \YiSP practice would sePm to call for a warning 
and the spcuring of an immunity waiver when-
ever it is even remotely possible that the testimony 
of a witness might tend to incriminate him." 
In Powell v. CHitecl States, 22G -F'.2d 2G9 (Cir.Ct. D.C. 
1955) the court states: 
''On the orn~ extreme it would seem to b» 
('leai· that a prosecutor could not evPn call to tlir 
stand in a criminal trial the iwrson being tri(·(l 
On the otl1n extrem<' it would seem to bP clear 
that a person smumoned to appear before a GraJ1(1 
,Jury could not validly ignore the sub1wena mere!! 
IH•c·auSl' an indictment against him might event-
nat<' from the inquiry. Somewhere between the 
two extremes is a line. No doubt it would be a 
boon to prosecuton; if tht•y could smnmon before 
a U rand Jury a pt> rs on against whom an indict-
lllPn t is lwing sought and there interrogate him, 
isolat<>d from thl' }Jrotection of counsel and pre--
siding judge and insulated from the critical obser-
vation o.f thP puhliC'. But there is a serious 
question whether our jurisprudence, fortified by 
C'Onstitutional declaration, permits that procedure. 
However, in the view which ·we take of the case 
at har. we do not reach this constitutional ques-
tion, avoiding it as \Yp should when it is possible 
to· do so." 
In (•onm·ct ion ·with the next to tlu~ last sentence of the 
above quote the C'Ourt refors to United States v. Lawn, 
Wi .F'.Supp. GI-± (D.C., N.Y. 1953) and 38 A.L.R. 2d 290. 
In the Lawn G(N>e the cuitrt said: 
"The court has inherent power, in its discre-
tion, to dismiss indictments obtained in violation 
of the rights of the defendants. It is also evident 
that such evidence as is obtained in violation of 
those rights may be ordered suppressed and re-
turned. In re Fried, 2 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 453, 
1 A.L.R. 2d 996." 
W<> take pxeerpts from tlw annotation in 38 A.L.R. 
~d :.!90 as follmYs: 
"Where the situation is such that in view 
of the general theory or practice obtaining in the 
particular jurisdiction as to the scope and effect 
of grand jury investigations, or by reason of such 
l'ador:-; as the ext<>nt to \Yhich the prosecuting or 
inw:-;tigating officials have expressly named the 
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witnL'Ss in tlH' prPs<'nt11wnt or other papPl' in.ct 1 
tuting the inv<'stigation, tlw eourt can S<'P that 11 1, 
investigation \Yas direckd against th<' '' it111·'> 
later indicted, then a holding that tht' i11did1111•n1 
\\·as invalid is t·o11m10n. ( Ln this situation th, 
view is freqtwntly taken, not only that tlH· witnf''> 
is protecil'd from lwing asked incriminating ques 
tions while a witness hefon' the grand .im>, lrnt 
even against lwi11g ealled as a \\·it11Pss hvfon· tliat 
body at all. Fmthennon•, it is fn•quentl~· irnl1 
cated in ea::;es involving this situation that the 
witness can attack tlw indiC'bllPnt even if h<~ failed 
to assert his constitutional privilege before the 
grand jury.)" 
"\Vhere the defrndant was cOllljJelled to lw a 
witness before tlw grand jury in an investigatiuJJ 
directed against him, and out of which he wa' 
imbseqm'ntly indictt>d, and he did not execute a 
waiver of i111111unity, and ht• testifo•d after !Jci11.~ 
advised of his constitutional privilPge to n·fn:-:1· 
to testify, the court in People v. Seaman (19±U) 
17-1 Misc. 792, 21 KYS 2d 917, orden~d the indid· 
ment dismissed, on the ground that th<~ rnle in 
:'\P\\' York State was that a lwrson's constitutional 
privilege ,,·as violakd when' he was compelled to 
appt·ar lwfon' a grn11d jury and testify in an in· 
v<•stigation clir<'d<-'d against him, and that a11 
indictme11t tlwruafkr found should be set asi<k, 
c>ven though he \\as \Yarned and failed to daim 
his p1·ivilPg\'. 1'lll' <'OlHt WPnt on to sa~' that it 
did not (kcid<· \\·hdher this rule applied wher1· 
a 1wrso11 was <·all<'d in a pnlC('l~ding din•efrrl 
against others. 
"lndid111(•nh against the <lefrndants 11·rr" 
qua:-'11(•<1 on 11H· gT01;11d that thPy had bePn dr·nied 
tlwir <·onstitutionnl 1·iglit not to b(~ <'.0111pelk,l l 11 
g1 \·e evid<•nel~ against tlu·rnsdv<~s, Ly being quc~ 
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timwd lwfore th<· grnml jury which indicted them, 
in Conimomualth v. Banc (19-±0) 39 Pa D & C 664, 
:: Fa.Htte Leg .T :291, when' the defendants were 
:-:uh1>oenaed to avpear lwfort~ the grand jury, and 
at the time the:: were subpot>naed they had been 
accusPd in a petition to the court of the specific 
nime;:.: to lw invt>stigated, and the defendants were 
<·ouqwlled to take the stand, and after being told 
that they could ndusP to answer the questions on 
lhe ground of self-incrimination, they were forced 
to Pl<·ct what com·s<' they 1rnuld take. The court 
stakd that the~, Wt're thus placed in a situation 
where not to s1wak in answer would seem to 
<·onfess guilt, and probably be more prejudicial 
than to give full utterance. rrhe witnesses were 
<'<llllpelled to give s1wcific and detailed evidence 
against themselves.'' 
•']n Pnited ~bte:-: v. ~dgerton (1897, D C 
~lont) 80 F 37-!,it was held that an indictment 
would he quaslwd where the defendant was re-
quire by subpoena to appear before the grand 
jury as a witness, and was sworn and examined 
and required to testify to material matters, with-
out bPing informed or having knowledge that the 
grand jury had undPr consideration any matter 
involving a criminal charge against him, the court 
stating that where a witness was compelled to 
testify against himst>lf, the injury inhered in the 
viok'nce done to his rights." 
''Although stating that tlw question was not 
involved in the instant case, the court in State v. 
Faulkner (1903) 175 1lo 5-±G, 75 SW 116, said: 
'l t iii intolPrahle that one whose conduct is being 
inwstigated for the purpose of fixing on him a 
niminal <'hargP should. in view of our constitu-
tional 111an<latP, lw smumorwd to testify against 
ltirn:-;elf and furnish evidence• upon which he may 
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be indicted. It i::-; a plain violation hoth of the 
letter and spirit of our organic law.' Tlw ('OUJ'I 
said that such a iirndicP could not he too strong\\ 
condemned.'' c • 
Plaintiff cites In Re Grolw11, 3G:2 U.S. :330 (1!J57) t11 
the effect that there is no constitutional right for an 
individual to have counsel before an administrative in-
vestigation held before a fire marshall. The Supn·1111· 
Court developments in the right to counsel privilegP 
against self-incrimination area have been so rnomPntou> 
and so striking in the last two years that Groba11, al-
though only nine calendar years old, is now "anciPnt 
history". Tlw four dissentE'rs in that case along witl1 
former .Justice Goldberg emerged as the majority iu 
Escobedo. In Escobedo it is held that the attorney j, 
requir<:>cl wh('n tli1· investigation has "begun to focus 
on a partieular ::;uspect." Furthermore, the rnajorih' 
court in lliirnnda 1·. Arizona, ________ U.S. ________ , 16 L.cd2<l 
69-l: (1966) at footnot(• 3() ciks with apparPnt approval 
from tlw clissPnting opinion of Justice Black in the 
Graban case. 
']
1 lu-' ca::w of Directory 8en;ices, Inc. ·u. United Stafr.1, 
:353 F.:2d :29~) (8th Cir. 19G5), contains a gratuitous PX 
pression d1·~uly clidurn that there ·was no right to counsel 
before a grand jnry ('iting 111 Re Graban and other pre-
}:scobedo cl1·cisions without even mentioning Esco/Jrdo. 
rl1hc· .K(:\\' York eomt in People v. Tomasello, ~()~ 
X.Y.S. :2d !)~\(j (19115) ckalt ·with tlH~ sul1ject of tlw eharg~ 
o·f iwrjnry having hP<'n c·ornmittPd hc·fore the grand .i111 1 
where it was demonstrn.kd that tlH~ witness was i11 fnl'l 
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tliP "targ<'l" of thl' investigatio1i. 'l'lw .New York court 
111 <lismissing th« indictment stakd: 
"l t ean hardly \w '"ainsaid that one -who is • b 
Ha111l'd hy the (hand .Jury as one ·who aided and 
alwttecl the conunission of crimes and conspired to 
commit crimes that ·were under investigation by 
i hat Grand .Jury was a target of the investigation. 
If a po,ssible defendant or target of an investiga-
tion is subpoenaed before a Grand .Jury and there 
t<•stifies, whdlwr or not he claims or asserts his 
privik·ge against self incrimination, his consti-
tntional privilege is deemed volated. 'An auto-
rnatic result of the violation of this constitutional 
privilegE~ is that the defendant is protected no,t 
only from indictment based on any incriminating 
tPstirnony which he may have given, but also from 
usP of such evidence.' Fuld, Jr., in People v. 
~kuding, G KY. 2d 21-± at 217, 189 N.Y.S. 2d 
lf)i) at 1G7, 160 N.E. 2d -!G8 at -169, 470. 
The instant perjury indictment is based upon 
the testimony of the defendant before the Grand 
.Tmy. It having been given under subpoena by 
a possible defendant, it was testimony under com-
pulsion in violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional privilege. That testimony may not be used 
against the defendant for any purpose. Such im-
11rnnity is eomplete and includes immunity against 
a charge of perjury for falsely testifying before 
the Grand .Jury. (People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 
127 N.E. 2d 592; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 
fiGG, 111N.Y.S.133). The exception as to perjury 
and contempt eontained in Section 2447 o.f the 
P1•nal La,,- has no application here. 
rl'he motion to disrniss the indictment must 
p1:·rforcl' be granted." 
2-± 
Plaintiff in jts brief herein states that th<· Tm11r1sc/l1, 
case and other N FW York cm;es do not havp eornpa rabJ 1, 
constitutional vrnvisions. ·we do not believe thi8 to Jw 
true and point to the reference in lllassiah to Spano I'. 
New Yark, 360 U.S. 315, as indicating that the New York 
court and the United States Suvreme Court arc in accord. 
In People v. Ianicllo, decided by the New York 
Supreme Court on June 24, 1966, and reported on in 
35 Law Week, page 2003, the Sixth Amendment is lwl<l 
to bar a criminal contempt indictment based on testimony 
of a grand jury witness that the witness ·was compelled 
to give after he had been denied access to his co1U1sPl 
who was outside the grand jury room. We quote in 
part from the report of the case as contained in th1 
above ref erred to Law Week. 
'·During the early stages of the accusPd'' 
testimony before the grand jury, he sought per-
mission to consult his attorney with refrrenc(' to 
<1uestions that were put to him. His requesb to 
eonsult ·with his attorney ·were refused hv botl1 
the fon•man of the grand jury and the as~istant 
district attonwy. He '-Vas then compelled to an-
sw<:.T numerous questions; most of his answers are 
now the subject matter of the indictment. 
"In Miranda v. Arizona, 34 LvV 4521 (lii 
L.ed.2d 694) the Supreme Court stated; 'lf tlw 
individual states that he wants an attorney the 
intenogation mu8t cease until an attorney is pre-
i-iCTit •• * ".' \Vhile this statPment referred to infrr-
rngation by the police of an accused suspeded of 
the commission of a crime, the refusal to allo\1 
the witness to 8peak to his counsel outside the 
grand jm-;· room to asc\'dain hi:-> rights deprived 
liint of c·ntms<'l in violation of both the state and 
1'1·d<'ral Constitutions. SincP th0 indictment is 
prP<lieakd upon the statements made by him after 
tlw l'l'<[U<'shi for eotmsd \Y<'n' denied, the denial 
ol' the n'qlwst:-> wh<'n <lPfrnclant most needed coun-
sPl violated his constitutional rights. 
"rrhis eourt is not suggesting that a witness 
lidon· a grand jun· in even· ease rna~y be afforded 
the right to con:-;nlt \\·ith c·ounsd before answering 
nn>· question:-; ]JOsc•d h>· the district attorney. In 
the instant ca:-,;1_•, had tlw aecused refused to answer 
questions on advice~ of comrnel, he would have had 
the opportunity of having the court pass upon 
t ht> propriety of his remaining silent and refusing 
to answPr questions. 'The statement made by the 
assistant district attorney to the witness "that 
U1<·1·p is no legal qucstiou involved" is a function 
!'or the eourt to pass upon as well as the decision 
of the forpman of the grand jury that before per-
rnitting thP aceused to consult with his attorney 
that "pc·rmission could not be given without the 
<·onse11t of tlw assistant district attorney.'' 'While 
this eourt doPs not intend to limit the right of the 
grand jury to investigate crime in this county, 
BPVPrtheless the rights of a witness as well as of 
an accused must be fully honored." 
CONCLUSION 
'!'])(~ 1·xtraordinary writ pra>'Pd for, whether it be 
11iandarnus or c·ertiorari, should not issue. To do so would 
11m c·ountl'r to the many unbroken expressions of this 
l'omt ~ine<> statPl10od. That the defendant District Judge 
ai:IL•d \\ithin tlw p1•ri111der of judieial discretion having 
)l1rit'diction in the premises is not c1uestioned. Right or 
wrong, the ruling in tlw ah:,;e11C(' of HlJjl(·al mnst stalHl. 
The corredness of tlH' ruling is rn~v(•rth<>ll'ss vouC'hed for 
by the authorities cited above. 
Counsel for the Stat<' erronPously ('Ollt<·n<ls that the 
ruling if allowed to stand "\rnnld Pff Pdiv<>l)· (•11iasrnlatP 
the grand jury system in the State of l'tah." 'l'his is an 
exaggerated concept. All tlw prn:,;e('u.ting attonwy ha> 
to do, he being familiar with the l'vid(•nce that he infrnds 
to adduce before tlw grand jury, is to avoid the com-
pulsory attendance of tlw "target'' of the investigation. 
Knowledge and <'xperience are the parents of finesS\' anrl 
sophistication, and as in other places the grand ;jun 
system is workable lwn' \\-hen the proper procedural tools 
art> applied. .f ust what counsel 11wans wlwn he refers to 
"political prPi'SlH<'S and elPction" as inhibiting or con-
trolling prns<·cnting attorneys is unclear, hut judge:; 
alwa~·s, and 1irndiC'ing attorne)·s \\·hether in privatr or 
public· lifr it is ho1w<1. \\-ill 1wwr snbordinat<> legal stand-
ards to frar or favoT no lll:itt\'r ,,·hat pre;;;;m·p is exertr<l. 
Plaintiff's petition slioul(l li<' n•;jf'ded. 
Hes J iedfully suhmittPd, 
<l ITS'I' LX & HICJIA RDR 
Hy 1 larley W. Gustin 
,\ UonH'\"s for Th(' l lonorahl<' 
llt•nr;- Hugg('j'i, Distrid .Jndg<· 
HilO \\'alkn Bank B11ilding 
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